Arbeitspapier
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
In this paper, we show that, contrarily to the conclusions obtained by Cremer and Thisse (1991), the equilibrium emerging from a model of vertical product differentiation does not yield maximum differentiation because of the strtegic complementarity between products in the quality space.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 164
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
1993
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5193
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1993
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Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
The Multiproduct Monopolist Under Vertical Differentiation: an Inductive Approach
Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion