Platform Competition with Endogenous Multihoming

Arbeitspapier

A model of two-sided market (for credit cards) is introduced and discussed. In this model, agents can join none, one, or more than one platform (multihoming), depending on access prices and the choices made by agents on the opposite market side. Although emerging multihoming patterns are, clearly, one aspect of equilibrium in a two-sided market, this issue has not yet been thoroughly addressed in the literature. This paper provides a general theoretical framework, in which homing partitions are conceived as one aspect of market equilibrium, rather than being set ex-ante, through ad-hoc assumptions. The emergence of a specific equilibrium partition is a consequence of: (1) the structure of costs and benefits, (2) the degree and type of heterogeneity among agents, (3) the intensity of platform competition.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 20.2005

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Industry Studies: Services: Other
• Thema: Two-sided markets ; Network externalities ; Standards ; Platforms ; Multihoming ; Marktstruktur ; Netzeffekt ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Roson, Roberto
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74190
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ