Arbeitspapier
Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists
This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9374
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
elections
party formation
platform choice
electoral uncertainty
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hansen, Emanuel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hansen, Emanuel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021