Arbeitspapier

Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists

This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9374

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
elections
party formation
platform choice
electoral uncertainty

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hansen, Emanuel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hansen, Emanuel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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