Arbeitspapier

Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming?

Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If users on both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on either side exclusive access to its users on the other side. In contrast, if users on one side can multihome, platforms exert monopoly power on that side and compete on the singlehoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true: the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 17-05

Classification: Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

Subject: Network effects
two-sided markets
platform competition
competitive bottle-neck
multihoming

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Belleflamme, Paul
Peitz, Martin

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

(where): Mannheim

(when): 2017

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179363

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-431939

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Belleflamme, Paul
Peitz, Martin
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Time of origin

2017

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