Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming?

Arbeitspapier

Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If users on both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on either side exclusive access to its users on the other side. In contrast, if users on one side can multihome, platforms exert monopoly power on that side and compete on the singlehoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true: the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 17-05

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
• Thema: Network effects ; two-sided markets ; platform competition ; competitive bottle-neck ; multihoming

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Belleflamme, Paul ; Peitz, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179363
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-431939
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ