Arbeitspapier

Homogeneous platform competition with endogenous homing

We develop a model for two-sided markets with consumers and producers, who interact through a platform. Typical settings for the model are the market for smartphones with phone users, app producers, and smartphone operating systems; or the video game market with game players, video game producers, and video game consoles. Only consumers who purchase the platform can access content from the producers. Consumers are heterogeneous in their gains from the producer side; and producers are heterogeneous in their costs of bringing apps to the platform. We consider competition between two homogeneous platforms that allows consumers and firms to optimize with respect to how they home, i.e. we allow both individual consumers and individual producers to multi-home or single-home depending on whether it is optimal based on their type. This leads to multiple equilibrium allocations of consumers and firms - all of which are seen in existing markets. We then find conditions under which a monopoly platform generates higher surplus than two competing homogeneous platforms.

ISBN
978-3-86304-165-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 166

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
two-sided markets
platforms
platform competition
multi-homing
single-homing
endogenous homing decisions
network effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Tremblay, Mark J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jeitschko, Thomas D.
  • Tremblay, Mark J.
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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