Arbeitspapier
Estimating private provision of public goods with heterogenous participants: A structural analysis
This paper estimates a structural model of private provision of public goods to provide some new empirical evidence on individuals' strategic contributing behaviors. In the model, individuals' contributing behaviors are allowed to be heterogenous and time-varying. We show that all the main components of the model including the number of different contributing strategies, functional form for each strategy, and how individuals adjust their strategies are identified from the revealed contribution choices of individuals. Further, the structural model is estimated using the data collected in a threshold public good experiment. The empirical results suggest that subjects in our experiment employ three contributing strategies, and they strategically respond to provision history by adjusting their preceding behavior. In addition, the response is heterogenous and dependent on subjects' contributing strategies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: cemmap working paper ; No. CWP18/15
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- Subject
-
Public Goods
Private Provision
Measurement Errors
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation
Experimental Data
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
An, Yonghong
Hu, Yingyao
Liu, Pengfei
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
- (where)
-
London
- (when)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2015.1815
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- An, Yonghong
- Hu, Yingyao
- Liu, Pengfei
- Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
Time of origin
- 2015
Other Objects (12)
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Are Program Participants Good Evaluators?
Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?
Heterogenous Switching Costs
Experience goods and provision of quality
Sustainable investing and public goods provision
Clientelism, public goods provision, and governance
Democratic provision of divisible public goods
Experience goods and provision of quality
Country Size and Public Good Provision
Nudging cooperation in public goods provision
Public Good Provision with a Distributor
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Are Program Participants Good Evaluators?
Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?
Heterogenous Switching Costs
Experience goods and provision of quality
Sustainable investing and public goods provision
Clientelism, public goods provision, and governance
Democratic provision of divisible public goods
Experience goods and provision of quality
Country Size and Public Good Provision
Nudging cooperation in public goods provision
Public Good Provision with a Distributor
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Are Program Participants Good Evaluators?
Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?
Heterogenous Switching Costs
Experience goods and provision of quality
Sustainable investing and public goods provision
Clientelism, public goods provision, and governance
Democratic provision of divisible public goods
Experience goods and provision of quality
Country Size and Public Good Provision
Nudging cooperation in public goods provision