Arbeitspapier
Experience goods and provision of quality
Delacroix and Shi (Pricing and signaling with frictions, Journal of Economics Theory 2013) study a model featuring buyers with unit demands and sellers with unit supplies. The sellers may produce a high- or a low-quality good. The buyers get a signal about quality but the signalling technology is quite specific; the signal is either completely revealing or uninformative. The author studies the same model with a symmetric signalling technology where high and low signals are always got with positive probability. As a consequence, whenever high-quality goods are produced also low-quality goods are produced. Instead of price posting the author studies trading by auctions. There are two equilibria, and the author quantifies the efficiency loss due to asymmetric information.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2017-19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Auctions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kultti, Klaus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kultti, Klaus
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2017
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