Arbeitspapier
Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?
We set up a general model on capital mobility which contains many of the models in the literature as special cases. The race to the bottom results not from a capital flight effect, but rather from a kind of Laffer curve effect in public good provision. Selectively introducing simplifying assumptions allows reproducing other models and understanding how they bias results in favor or against capital mobility. We then show how the net effect of capital mobility can be positive or negative within the same model depending on the relative capital endowment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4420
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- Thema
-
capital mobility
interjurisdictional competition
public good provision
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schwerhoff, Gregor
Edenhofer, Ottmar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schwerhoff, Gregor
- Edenhofer, Ottmar
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
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