Bilateral information sharing in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of information sharing is consistent with equilibrium, and is a constant feature of equilibrium when the number of firms is not too small. Our result is to be contrasted with the traditional conclusion that no information is shared in common values situations with strategic substitutes - such as Cournot competition with demand shocks - when firms can only make industry-wide sharing contracts (e.g., a trade association).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2007-15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: information sharing ; oligopoly ; networks ; Bayesian equilibrium ; Wissenstransfer ; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb ; Oligopol ; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht ; Bayes-Statistik

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Currarini, Sergio ; Feri, Francesco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71957
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET