Arbeitspapier
Vertical Differentiation in a Cournot Industry: The Porter Hypothesis and Beyond
We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 730
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4511
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tampieri, Alessandro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2011
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