Arbeitspapier
Competition among Coalitions in a Cournot Industry: A Validation of the Porter Hypothesis
We determine the emergence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a setting where the initial technology is polluting, firms decide whether to be brown or green and compete in quantities. We find that the Porter hypothesis may emerge as a market configuration with all green firms spurred by environmental regulation, even if consumers are not environmentally concerned. Finally, we single out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the green grand coalition is socially optimal and therefore yields a win-win outcome.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 989
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: General
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Pignataro, Giuseppe
Tampieri, Alessandro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4158
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Pignataro, Giuseppe
- Tampieri, Alessandro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2015
Other Objects (12)
Vertical Differentiation in a Cournot Industry: The Porter Hypothesis and Beyond
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Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Bertrand versus Cournot with Convex Variable Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Vertical Differentiation in a Cournot Industry: The Porter Hypothesis and Beyond
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Bertrand versus Cournot with Convex Variable Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Vertical Differentiation in a Cournot Industry: The Porter Hypothesis and Beyond
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Bertrand versus Cournot with Convex Variable Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition