- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
-
21 cm
- Extent
-
29 S.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
graph. Darst.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Working paper series / Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg ; No. 2003,3
- Keyword
-
Leistungsentgelt
Führungskräfte
Leistungsanreiz
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Risikoaversion
Theorie
Leistungslohn
Führungskraft
Anreizsystem
LEN-Modell
Risikoaversion
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Magdeburg
- (who)
-
Univ., FEMM
- (when)
-
2003
- Creator
-
Lukas, Christian
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.06.2025, 2:23 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Lukas, Christian
- Univ., FEMM
Time of origin
- 2003
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