Artikel
Market competition and executive pay
Deregulation and managerial compensation are two important topics on the political and academic agenda. The former has been a significant policy recommendation in light of the negative effects associated with overly restrictive regulation on markets and the economy. The latter relates to the sharp increase in top executives' pay and the nature of the link between pay and performance. To the extent that product-market competition can affect the incentive schemes offered by firms to their executives, the analysis of the effects of competition on the structure of compensation may be informative for policy purposes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: IZA World of Labor ; ISSN: 2054-9571 ; Year: 2015 ; Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
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barriers to entry
entry costs
competition
executive compensation
performance-related pay
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ferreira, Priscila
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.15185/izawol.115
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Ferreira, Priscila
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2015
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