Arbeitspapier
How (not) to pay non-executive directors
Performance pay, at least as usually understand, is no good idea for non-executive directors. They have to supervise and control or in some situations even to fire and replace the executive managers. This means that their performance as supervisors is totally different from the performance of the supervised executive managers and even the company at large. Moreover, they are mostly interested in other things than their pay. Thus, their pay should be fixed and not too high.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik ; No. 9/2012
- Klassifikation
-
Management
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Business Economics
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Business and Securities Law
- Thema
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Aufsichtsrat
Leistungsentgelt
Anforderungsprofil
Kritik
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dilger, Alexander
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik
- (wo)
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Münster
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dilger, Alexander
- Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik
Entstanden
- 2012