Arbeitspapier
Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 11/143
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
elections
campaign contributions
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Politikfinanzierung
Interessenpolitik
Gleichgewichtsmodell
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (where)
-
Zurich
- (when)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006396483
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Time of origin
- 2011
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