Information acquisition in conflicts

Abstract: "This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. We characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information. The type of one player is common knowledge. The type of the other player is drawn from a continuous distribution and is private information of this player. We then use our results to study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. Depending on the cost of information, only one player may invest in information. If the decision to acquire information is observable for the opponent, but not the information received, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, compared with the first best, information acquisition is excessive. In contrast, with open or covert information acquisition, the cut-off values for equilibrium information acquisition are as in the first best." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Informationsbeschaffung in Konflikten
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 33 S.
• Language: Deutsch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2009-10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Keyword: Konflikt ; Informationsbeschaffung ; Informationsversorgung ; Informationsverhalten ; Auktionstheorie ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2009
• Creator: Morath, Florian ; Münster, Johannes
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-258195
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:28 AM CEST