Information acquisition in vertical relations

Arbeitspapier

We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer's incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1543

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Subject: asymmetric information ; information acquisition ; vertical relations

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Baake, Pio ; Harasser, Andreas ; Heiny, Friederike
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127443
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET