Arbeitspapier

Collusive vertical relations

We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative scenarios envisaging different deviations by the upstream firm and different punishments. This allows us to show that the most efficient case is that in which the upstream firm deviates along its best reply function and the punishment prescribes the disruption of the vertical relation for good after a deviation from the collusive path.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1103

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Thema
collusion
double marginalisation
supply chain
vertical integration

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bolatto, Stefano
Lambertini, Luca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5615
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bolatto, Stefano
  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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