Optional linear input prices in vertical relations

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price level: If the regulated price is not too high, the option allows for price discrimination, but prevents foreclosure in the intermediary market. Indeed, if both cost and optional price are rather low, non-discriminatory input prices below cost may arise. Optional input prices are socially more desirable than a flat ban on price discrimination, as consumers benefit from more intense downstream competition.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 258

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Thema: price discrimination ; vertical contracting ; exclusion ; regulatory outside option ; Netzinfrastruktur ; Lieferantenmanagement ; Preisdifferenzierung ; Netzregulierung ; Vorleistungen ; Preisregulierung ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Salim, Claudia
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13294
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94101
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13294-6
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ