Information acquisition in conflicts

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults to study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. If the decision to acquire information is observable, but not the informatio nreceived, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, the cutoff values of the cost of information that determine equilibrium information acquisition are higher than in the first best. Thus, information acquisition is excessive. Incontrast, with open or covert information acquisition, the equilibrium cut-off values are as in the first best.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 314

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: All-pay auctions ; Conflicts ; Contests ; Information acquisition ; Konflikt ; Informationsversorgung ; Informationsverhalten ; Auktionstheorie ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Morath, Florian ; Münster, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13240
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94028
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13240-2
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET