Arbeitspapier

Securities lending and information acquisition

Using microdata on stock-level lending positions from German mutual funds, we show that active funds use the equity lending market to obtain information about short sale demand. Funds reduce long positions in response to these demand signals, which allows fund managers to front-run public disclosure of big short positions and avoid future losses. Fund managers exploit this information advantage across funds they manage, but do not share it within their fund family, consistent with short demand signals providing an information advantage. Our results suggest a new motive for securities lending and an information aggregation role for the equity lending market.

ISBN
978-3-95729-981-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 08/2024

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Equity lending markets
mutual funds
short sales
short interest
price revelation
public disclosure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Greppmair, Stefan
Jank, Stephan
Saffi, Pedro A. C.
Sturgess, Jason
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2024

Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Greppmair, Stefan
  • Jank, Stephan
  • Saffi, Pedro A. C.
  • Sturgess, Jason
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 2024

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