Arbeitspapier
All-pay contests with constraints
This paper provides simple closed form formulae for players' expected payoffs in a broad class of all-pay contests where players may have constraints on their actions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP12/04
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
- (wo)
-
Dublin
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pastine, Ivan
- Pastine, Tuvana
- University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012
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