Arbeitspapier
Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: Head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids. In the all-pay auction, head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first-best revenue. In the lottery contest, head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue. As all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests under optimal biases, we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue-ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6274
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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all-pay auction
lottery contest
favoritism
head start
revenue dominance
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Franke, Jörg
Leininger, Wolfgang
Wasser, Cédric
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Franke, Jörg
- Leininger, Wolfgang
- Wasser, Cédric
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016