Arbeitspapier

Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests

We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: Head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids. In the all-pay auction, head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first-best revenue. In the lottery contest, head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue. As all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests under optimal biases, we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue-ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6274

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
all-pay auction
lottery contest
favoritism
head start
revenue dominance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Franke, Jörg
Leininger, Wolfgang
Wasser, Cédric
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Wasser, Cédric
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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