Arbeitspapier

Does Affirmative Action Reduce Effort Incentives? – A Contest Game Analysis

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of affirmative action in competitive environments modeled as contest games. Competition is between heterogeneous players where heterogeneity might be due to past discrimination. Two policy options are analyzed that tackle the underlying asymmetry: Either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. It is shown in a simple two-player contest game that a tradeoff between affirmative action and high effort exertion does not exist. Instead, the implementation of affirmative action fosters effort incentives. Similar results hold in the n-player contest as well as under imperfect information if the heterogeneity between contestants is moderate.

ISBN
978-3-86788-208-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 185

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
Thema
Asymmetric contest
affirmative action
discrimination
Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung
Gleichbehandlungsrecht
Extensives Spiel
Leistungsanreiz
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Franke, Jörg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
(wo)
Essen
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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