Arbeitspapier

Repeated Contests with Draws

We consider a simple contest game with draws where with some probability none of the contestants is selected as winner. If such an outcome occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of the contestants wins the prize or until a final last period is reached. Allowing for finite as well as infinite time horizons and different variations in the timing of effort decisions, the theoretical analysis of this model reveals that the dynamic contest structure has profound implications for intertemporal effort substitution and contest revenue.

ISBN
978-3-96973-182-6
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 1016

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
Contest theory
repeated contest
dynamic contest
contest with draws

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Franke, Jörg
Metzger, Lars P.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
(where)
Essen
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.4419/96973182
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Metzger, Lars P.
  • RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

Time of origin

  • 2023

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