Arbeitspapier
Repeated Contests with Draws
We consider a simple contest game with draws where with some probability none of the contestants is selected as winner. If such an outcome occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of the contestants wins the prize or until a final last period is reached. Allowing for finite as well as infinite time horizons and different variations in the timing of effort decisions, the theoretical analysis of this model reveals that the dynamic contest structure has profound implications for intertemporal effort substitution and contest revenue.
- ISBN
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978-3-96973-182-6
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 1016
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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Contest theory
repeated contest
dynamic contest
contest with draws
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Franke, Jörg
Metzger, Lars P.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- (where)
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Essen
- (when)
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2023
- DOI
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doi:10.4419/96973182
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Franke, Jörg
- Metzger, Lars P.
- RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Time of origin
- 2023