Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests

Arbeitspapier

The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the optimal lottery cannot be dominated by an all-pay-auction.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011-29

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: contest design ; efforts (revenue) maximization ; discrimination ; endogenous lottery ; all-pay auction

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef ; Nitzan, Shmuel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Ramat-Gan
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96077
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ