Arbeitspapier
All-pay contests with constraints
This paper provides simple closed form formulae for players' expected payoffs in a broad class of all-pay contests where players may have constraints on their actions.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP12/04
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
- (where)
-
Dublin
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pastine, Ivan
- Pastine, Tuvana
- University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
Time of origin
- 2012
Other Objects (12)
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests
All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance.
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests
All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance.
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests
All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance.
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments