Accuracy of proposers' beliefs in an allocation-type game

Arbeitspapier

In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer´s reported beliefs about the responder´s willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer´s beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer´s beliefs is estimated. The estimated proposer´s beliefs are then compared with the actual responder´s choices. As a result of this comparison, we observe that the proposer tends to underestimate the empirical acceptance probability, especially when the slice of the pie allocated to the proposer is large.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-002

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Model Construction and Estimation ; Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection ; Noncooperative Games ; Expectations; Speculations
• Subject: allocation game ; beliefs elicitation and evaluation ; model construction and estimation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Alberti, Federica ; Conte, Anna ; Tsutsui, Kei
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98447
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET