Arbeitspapier
Repeated Implementation
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1205
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kalai, Ehud
Ledyard, John O.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kalai, Ehud
- Ledyard, John O.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1997
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Repeated implementation
Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation
Repeated Nash implementation
Collateral and Repeated Lending
Repeated Contests with Draws
Beliefs in repeated games
On repeated difference testing
Modified repeated median filters
Beliefs in repeated games
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Explicit renegotiation in repeated games
Repeated implementation
Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation
Repeated Nash implementation
Collateral and Repeated Lending
Repeated Contests with Draws
Beliefs in repeated games
On repeated difference testing
Modified repeated median filters
Beliefs in repeated games
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Explicit renegotiation in repeated games
Repeated implementation
Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation
Repeated Nash implementation
Collateral and Repeated Lending
Repeated Contests with Draws
Beliefs in repeated games
On repeated difference testing
Modified repeated median filters
Beliefs in repeated games
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions