Arbeitspapier

Collateral and Repeated Lending

Lending is often associated with significant asymmetric information issues between suppliers of funds and their potential borrowers. Banks can screen their borrowers, or can require them to post collateral in order to select creditworthy projects. We find that the potential for longer-term relationships increases banks' preference for screening. This is because posting collateral only provides the information that the current project of a given borrower is of good quality, whereas screening provides information that can be used in evaluating future projects as well as the current ones.

ISBN
978-82-7553-706-3
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012/18

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
collateral
screening
bank relationships

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Karapetyan, Artashes
Stacescu, Bogdan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Norges Bank
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Karapetyan, Artashes
  • Stacescu, Bogdan
  • Norges Bank

Time of origin

  • 2012

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