Arbeitspapier

Collateral and Repeated Lending

Lending is often associated with significant asymmetric information issues between suppliers of funds and their potential borrowers. Banks can screen their borrowers, or can require them to post collateral in order to select creditworthy projects. We find that the potential for longer-term relationships increases banks' preference for screening. This is because posting collateral only provides the information that the current project of a given borrower is of good quality, whereas screening provides information that can be used in evaluating future projects as well as the current ones.

ISBN
978-82-7553-706-3
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012/18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
collateral
screening
bank relationships

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Karapetyan, Artashes
Stacescu, Bogdan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Karapetyan, Artashes
  • Stacescu, Bogdan
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2012

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