Arbeitspapier
Repeated Implementation
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1205
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kalai, Ehud
Ledyard, John O.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kalai, Ehud
- Ledyard, John O.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1997
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