Arbeitspapier
Large Poisson Games
Existence of equilibria is proven for Poisson games with compact type sets and finite action sets. Then three theorems are introduced for characterizing limits of probabilities in Poisson games when the expected number of players becomes large. The magnitude theorem characterizes the rate at which probabilities of events go zero. The offset theorem characterizes the ratios of probabilites of events that differ by a finite additive translation. The hyperplane theorem estimates probabilites of hyperplane events. These theorems are applied to derive formulas for pivot probabilities in binary elections, and to analyze a voting game that was studied by Ledyard.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1189
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Myerson, Roger B.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Myerson, Roger B.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1997
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