Arbeitspapier
Partially-specified large games
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a diØ culty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1403
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Spieltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kalai, Ehud
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kalai, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2005
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