Arbeitspapier
Partially-specified large games
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a diØ culty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1403
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Spieltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kalai, Ehud
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kalai, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2005
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