Arbeitspapier

Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Poisson model of games with population uncertainty is extended, by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility functions may depend on an unknown state of the world. Such extended Poisson games are applied to prove a generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1103

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Myerson, Roger B.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
1994

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Myerson, Roger B.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 1994

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