Artikel
A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 227-252 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Subject
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Voting
information aggregation
costly information
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Szentes, Balazs
Koriyama, Yukio
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New York, NY
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Szentes, Balazs
- Koriyama, Yukio
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2009