Artikel

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 227-252 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subject
Voting
information aggregation
costly information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Szentes, Balazs
Koriyama, Yukio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Szentes, Balazs
  • Koriyama, Yukio
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2009

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