Artikel

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 227-252 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
Voting
information aggregation
costly information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Szentes, Balazs
Koriyama, Yukio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Szentes, Balazs
  • Koriyama, Yukio
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2009

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