Arbeitspapier
Condorcet's jury theorem as a rational justification of soft paternalistic consumer policies
The objective of this note is to revisit the meaningfulness of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and apply it to the recent debate on liberal paternalism and consumer protection. The CJT con-sists of two parts, (a) stating that a jury of experts is always more competent than a single expert given a certain level of competence, and (b) asserting that for large juries, the collective com-petence approaches infallibility. This note argues that these insights suggest the application of a Condorcet jury voting procedure to the case of nudging boundedly rational consumers. The note proposes a simple calculus for finding an optimal jury size and advocates consumers' meta-preferences as the jury's evaluative dimension for designing soft paternalistic policies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2015-07
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economic Methodology
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Bounded Rationality
Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consumer Policy
Educative Nudges
Hierarchical Preferences
Knowledge Problem
Liberal Paternalism
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dold, Malte
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
- (where)
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Freiburg
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dold, Malte
- Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
Time of origin
- 2015
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