A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
ISSN
1432-0479
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
online resource.

Bibliographic citation
A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters ; volume:35 ; number:3 ; day:4 ; month:5 ; year:2007 ; pages:607-611 ; date:6.2008
Economic theory ; 35, Heft 3 (4.5.2007), 607-611, 6.2008

Classification
Wirtschaft

Creator
Lindner, Ines
Contributor
SpringerLink (Online service)

DOI
10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021082918512575287823
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST

Data provider

This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Associated

  • Lindner, Ines
  • SpringerLink (Online service)

Other Objects (12)