A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1432-0479
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters ; volume:35 ; number:3 ; day:4 ; month:5 ; year:2007 ; pages:607-611 ; date:6.2008
Economic theory ; 35, Heft 3 (4.5.2007), 607-611, 6.2008
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
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Lindner, Ines
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021082918512575287823
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
- 15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST
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Associated
- Lindner, Ines
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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