Artikel
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1055-1093 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Large games
pure strategy
Nash equilibrium
generic property
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Carmona, Guilherme
Podczeck, Konrad
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3967
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Carmona, Guilherme
- Podczeck, Konrad
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2021
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