Arbeitspapier
Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9913
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: General
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
- Thema
-
Nash equilibrium
viability
laboratory experiments
coordination game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kim, Duk Gyoo
Min, Daehong
Wooders, John
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kim, Duk Gyoo
- Min, Daehong
- Wooders, John
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022