Arbeitspapier

Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9913

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: General
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Thema
Nash equilibrium
viability
laboratory experiments
coordination game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kim, Duk Gyoo
Min, Daehong
Wooders, John
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kim, Duk Gyoo
  • Min, Daehong
  • Wooders, John
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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