Arbeitspapier

Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9913

Classification
Wirtschaft
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: General
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Subject
Nash equilibrium
viability
laboratory experiments
coordination game

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kim, Duk Gyoo
Min, Daehong
Wooders, John
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.08.2056, 12:46 PM CEST

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kim, Duk Gyoo
  • Min, Daehong
  • Wooders, John
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2022

Other Objects (12)