Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9913

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: General ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
• Subject: Nash equilibrium ; viability ; laboratory experiments ; coordination game

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kim, Duk Gyoo ; Min, Daehong ; Wooders, John
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/265948