Artikel

Contribution-based grouping under noise

Many real-world mechanisms are 'noisy' or 'fuzzy', that is the institutions in place to implement them operate with non-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory are also robust to more realistic assumptions such as noise. In this paper, in the context of voluntary contribution games, we focus on a mechanism known as 'contribution-based competitive grouping'. First, we analyze how the mechanism works under noise and what happens when other assumptions such as population homogeneity are relaxed. Second, we investigate the welfare properties of the mechanism, interpreting noise as a policy instrument, and we use logit dynamic simulations to formulate mechanism design recommendations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-23 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
voluntary contributions
behavioral economics
noise
heterogeneity
mechanism design
welfare
efficiency
equality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nax, Heinrich H.
Murphy, Ryan O.
Duca, Stefano
Helbing, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3390/g8040050
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Nax, Heinrich H.
  • Murphy, Ryan O.
  • Duca, Stefano
  • Helbing, Dirk
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2017

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