Contribution-based grouping under noise

Artikel

Many real-world mechanisms are 'noisy' or 'fuzzy', that is the institutions in place to implement them operate with non-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory are also robust to more realistic assumptions such as noise. In this paper, in the context of voluntary contribution games, we focus on a mechanism known as 'contribution-based competitive grouping'. First, we analyze how the mechanism works under noise and what happens when other assumptions such as population homogeneity are relaxed. Second, we investigate the welfare properties of the mechanism, interpreting noise as a policy instrument, and we use logit dynamic simulations to formulate mechanism design recommendations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-23 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• Subject: voluntary contributions ; behavioral economics ; noise ; heterogeneity ; mechanism design ; welfare ; efficiency ; equality

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nax, Heinrich H. ; Murphy, Ryan O. ; Duca, Stefano ; Helbing, Dirk
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2017

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g8040050
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179160
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET