Artikel
Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 971-1014 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Renegotiation proof
mechanism design
verification
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Silva, Francisco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3190
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Silva, Francisco
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2019
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Renegotiation-proof mechanism design
Lectures on proof verification and approximation algorithms
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
Computer verification of algorithms using a formal proof system
A new proof-of-work mechanism for bitcoin
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
On Coins, Parallel Universes and the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Imperfect certification
Imperfect Certification
Imperfect Signals
Renegotiation-proof mechanism design
Lectures on proof verification and approximation algorithms
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
Computer verification of algorithms using a formal proof system
A new proof-of-work mechanism for bitcoin
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
On Coins, Parallel Universes and the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Imperfect certification
Imperfect Certification
Imperfect Signals
Renegotiation-proof mechanism design
Lectures on proof verification and approximation algorithms
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
Computer verification of algorithms using a formal proof system
A new proof-of-work mechanism for bitcoin
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
On Coins, Parallel Universes and the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Imperfect certification
Imperfect Certification