Artikel
Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 971-1014 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Renegotiation proof
mechanism design
verification
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Silva, Francisco
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3190
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Silva, Francisco
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019
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