Artikel
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a higher cash transfer, pay a lower price to enter the lottery, and face a higher sales tax. They are also randomly inspected.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1139-1194 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Publicly Provided Private Goods
- Thema
-
Mechanism design
budget constraints
efficiency
costly verification
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Li, Yunan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3907
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Li, Yunan
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2021
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Costly verification in collective decisions
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Reinsuring the poor: group microinsurance Design and costly state verification
Versicherungsbetrug aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht und Aspekte von "Costly-State-Verification"-Modellen
Communicating rational agents: semantics and verification
Costly miscalibration
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
Costly Inflation Misperceptions
The costly disobedience.
Costly Information Acquisition
Time Constrained Verification of Analog Circuits using Model-Checking Algorithms
Costly verification in collective decisions
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Reinsuring the poor: group microinsurance Design and costly state verification
Versicherungsbetrug aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht und Aspekte von "Costly-State-Verification"-Modellen
Communicating rational agents: semantics and verification
Costly miscalibration
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
Costly Inflation Misperceptions
The costly disobedience.
Costly Information Acquisition
Time Constrained Verification of Analog Circuits using Model-Checking Algorithms
Costly verification in collective decisions
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Reinsuring the poor: group microinsurance Design and costly state verification
Versicherungsbetrug aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht und Aspekte von "Costly-State-Verification"-Modellen
Communicating rational agents: semantics and verification
Costly miscalibration
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
Costly Inflation Misperceptions
The costly disobedience.
Costly Information Acquisition