Artikel
Costly miscalibration
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a microfoundation for the commitment solution.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 477-506 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Calibration
miscalibration
cheap talk
commitment
Bayesian persuasion
e-commerce platform
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Guo, Yingni
Shmaya, Eran
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3991
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Guo, Yingni
- Shmaya, Eran
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2021
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