Arbeitspapier
Delayed verification mechanism for dynamic implementation
This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agent´s betting reward depends on how accurately the prior updated on his report predicts the type reports observed in the following period. The mechanism satisfies participation constraints and generates no deficit after any reported history.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2014/11
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Expectations; Speculations
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- Subject
-
dynamic mechanisms
scoring rule
Bayesian learning
conjugate priors
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gorelkina, Olga
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gorelkina, Olga
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2014
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