Arbeitspapier

Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners' dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving at the cost of reducing their own monetary payoff. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. The overall conclusion from our results is that striving for efficiency is constrained by equity concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in onesided gift-relationships.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2001,6

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Ockenfels, Axel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048591
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Kliemt, Hartmut
  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 2000

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