Arbeitspapier

Local public good provision, municipal consolidation, and national transfers

We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a region comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighboring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village. When districts consolidate, underprovision persists in the village (and may become even more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to vote for consolidation. We examine how national transfers to local governments can resolve these problems.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2061

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Lokales öffentliches Gut
Stadt-Land-Beziehung
Spillover-Effekt
Gebietsreform
Wahlverhalten
Finanzausgleich
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dur, Robert
Staal, Klaas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dur, Robert
  • Staal, Klaas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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